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The Great Game that Never Ends: China 





Kazakhstan occupies a unique geopolitical position in 
Eurasia. Kazakhstan has gradually emerged as a regional 
power as a result of its economic progress and „multi-
vector‟ foreign policy. China‟s policy in Kazakhstan is 
linked to its larger strategic and geo-political interests 
following the disintegration of the former USSR. China‟s 
economic policy is also largely based on its energy 
security needs and search for a market for its finished 
goods. Simultaneously, there is also a fear among Chinese 
policy makers with regard to the „opening up „of its north 
western frontier towards the Muslim Republics of Central 
Asia as it involves the risk of Islamic fundamentalism and 
cross-border ethnic separatism that may pose grave threat 
to China‟s national security. China has achieved a 
significant advantage over any potential competitor and 
has created an important infrastructure base in 
Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan‟s foreign cooperation with 
Russia or the West will no longer change this trend of 
increased interaction with China.  
Keywords: Geopolitics, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
Shanghai Five, Silk Route, Historic Border Accord, Strategic 
Balance 
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After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the Central Asian 
Republic of Kazakhstan emerged as an independent and sovereign 
country. Kazakhstan was born as an independent republic country 
from the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991 was neither the 
result of secessionist demands by its leadership nor any national 
liberation movement (Cuming, 2005). 
Kazakhstan is situated at the centre of the Eurasian continent and 
occupies a territory of 2,717,300 square kilometers. In terms of area, 
Kazakhstan is the ninth largest country in the world and has a 
peculiar geostrategic situation; with almost all its territory 
coincides with Mckinder Heartland theory. Kazakhstan shares a 
border of 1700 km with China; both the countries share three rivers 
(Irytuysh, Emin and Ili) which further enhance the geopolitical 
importance of Kazakhstan vis-à-vis China (Abishev, 2002). 
Kazakhstan is located between two great powers - one Asian 
(China) and one Asian-European (Russia) – and to its south are the 
Central Asian countries of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. To enter this land-locked country, one should pass 
through the territory of these neighbouring countries.  
During the time of the ancient Silk Road, both China and 
Kazakhstan were economically and culturally interlinked with each 
other through Xinjiang province. During the Soviet period, only 
informal trade existed between the two countries. But, after the 
independence of Kazakhstan, new land ports for facilitating trade 
were established on both sides of the border.  The greatest 
momentum of economic ties between the two countries lies in the 
fact that the present Kazakhstan is rich in energy resources, which 
can fulfil the demands of energy-hungry China. In the era of 
globalization, where economic issues matter as much as security 
issues in deciding the strength of a nation in the world arena, 
Kazakhstan and China seek to enhance the complementary nature 
of their economies by forging strong economic linkages. 
The importance of Kazakhstan is recognised by its vast oil and 
natural gas resources. In the initial phase after independence, 
various speculations were made about the amount of the oil and 
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natural gas resources present in Kazakhstan. The energy resources 
present in Kazakhstan are vast, but the country is landlocked. To 
transport these energy resources to the refineries and the market, 
the erstwhile Soviet Union constructed the largest integrated 
pipeline network in the world. After the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, new players, particularly China, has sought to secure access 
to these energy resources and transmission corridors.  
Table 1.1 Estimated Energy Reserves 
 Estimated energy reserves 
 Fossil Fuels Nuclear Renewables  
 

















942.20 31.16 66.28 
328.31 
(372.08 
47.2 5.525 1420.7 
* Solid, Liquid: Million tons; Gas: Billion m3; Uranium: Metric tons; Hydro, Renewable: TW 
(1) This total represents essentially recoverable reserves. 
(2) For comparison purposes, a rough attempt is made to convert hydro capacity to energy 
by multiplying the gross theoretical annual capability (World Energy Council – 2002) by a 
factor of 10. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook. 
Link:http://pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/CNPP2013_CD/countryprofiles/Kaza
khstan/kazakhstan.htm 
There are considerable hydrocarbon resources in Kazakhstan which 
is important for the world. As the second largest economic power 
in the world, China needs vast amounts of energy resources. 
However, the world market is under the control of dominant 
powers such as the United States control the international marine 
trade routes of oil transportation alongside important energy 
producing regions like the Middle East, North Africa, West Africa, 
Latin America and East Asia. In comparison, Kazakhstan‟s energy 
resources are available for China without the interference of an 
outside player. Kazakhstan could also supply energy by way of an 
intercontinental pipeline network from Central Asia and even 
through Iran. Also, Kazakhstan‟s energy resources are constant and 





useful for China‟s developing economy. The inauguration of oil 
transit pipeline from Kazakhstan to China in early 2005 is 
significant from this point of view. Besides the energy resources, 
China is also seeking raw materials, which are abundantly 
available in Kazakhstan. These show the eco-strategic importance 
of Kazakhstan. In this regard, the shaping and forming of Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has two major energy 
producers (Russia and Kazakhstan) and major energy consumer 
(China) as its members. 
Kazakhstan and the New Great Game in Central Asia 
In the post-Soviet period, the three key players in the geopolitical 
space around Central Asia - Russia, China and the United States - 
achieved a provisional equilibrium. Russia maintained its 
traditional dominance in its former southern Central Asian 
provinces. China, as it developed its economic relations with the 
Central Asian countries, gradually increased its own political 
influence, while seeking to avoid confrontation with Moscow. The 
United States, despite its preoccupation with other areas of greater 
strategic significance, kept a wary eye on the region. In the context 
of the “New Great Game”, Kazakhstan has pursued a balanced 
foreign policy and worked to develop its economy, especially its 
hydrocarbon industry. While the country's economic outlook is 
improving, President Nazarbayev maintains strict control over the 
country's politics.  
China has achieved a significant advantage over any potential 
competitors and created an important infrastructure base, which in 
a few years will probably be more modern and more powerful than 
that of Kazakhstan and Russia. It seems that even the 
intensification of Kazakhstan‟s foreign cooperation with Russia or 
the West will no more change this trend of increased interaction 
and convergence with China, as it will always be one step ahead of 
other interested parties. Another advantage in Beijing‟s favour is its 
ability to satisfy requests for the economic development of 
Kazakhstan. While Astana has faced foreign investors‟ reluctance 
to help its domestic manufacturing industry, China has proved 
more flexible and far-sighted, a situation that is well received by 
Kazakhstani leaders as a means to promote long-term plans. 
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China as a Major Player 
China‟s policy in Kazakhstan is associatedwithit's larger strategic 
and geopolitical interests. There is fear among the Chinese 
policymakerswith regard to the policy of „opening up‟ of its 
northwestern frontier towards the Muslim Republics of Central 
Asia as it would invite the risk of Islamic fundamentalism and 
cross-border ethnic separatism which are grave threats to China‟s 
national security (Misra, 2001).  
The collapse of USSR, the independence of Islamic Central Asian 
Republics, the continuing ferment among the Turkic Uygurs in 
Xinjiang province of China, and the emergence of a unipolar world 
dominated by the US, have been causes of concern for China. China 
looks for close and friendly ties with its Central Asian neighbours 
in general and Kazakhstan in particular. 
Beijing is keen to play an important role in regional affairs making 
the best use of its political, economic and military capabilities. 
Independent Kazakhstan has provided China with an opportunity 
to re-assert its traditional regional interests.  The Chinese policy has 
been to maintain peace and tranquillity along its border with 
Xinjiang. China has been wary of its minority ethnic group of 
Uygur Muslims being subjected to any separatist influence. So, 
Chinese position in Xinjiang depends as much on Beijing‟s ability 
to influence events across its border as it does on controlling events 
within. 
The most important concern of China is the security of its border 
region in Xinjiang. Many Uighurs live in Kazakhstan and there is 
also a substantial Kazakh minority living in China‟s Xinjiang 
province both having their relatives living on either side of the 
border. This situation has caused serious disquiet in China, 
especially in the 1990s. However, after establishing good relations 
with neighbouring Central Asian countries and establishment of 
the SCO, China has ensured its security in Xinjiang besides 
promoting bilateral trade. Chinese policy towards Kazakhstan has 
thus been governed by both strategic and economic considerations, 
which have strong linkages with the geopolitics of Xinjiang. 
Kazakhstan has also attracted huge Chinese investment in oil and 
gas sectors and other industries. Shanghai-5 was a successful 





confidence-building effort. Eventually, this organisation, which 
was later renamed as SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) is 
serving as a vehicle for enhancing China‟s role in resolving regional 
security problems (Olcott, 2002).  
China‟s policy in Kazakhstan has an economic angle which is 
largely based on its energy security needs and search for a market 
for its finished goods. Kazakhstan has proven oil reserves of about 
2.6 billion tons and proven natural gas reserves of 3 trillion cubic 
meters. Kazakhstan‟s strength emanates from its rich energy and 
other natural resources and over the past few years, Kazakhstan 
has witnessed high economic growth due to the boom in oil prices 
(Konuralp, 2004).At the same time China, which is dependent on 
oil, imports it to sustain its high economic growth. For China, the 
economic development and cooperation of Central Asian Republics 
would help in promoting regional economic stability and 
prosperity, which in turn would lead to political stability and 
China needs a stable and peaceful international environment for its 
flourishing trade.  
China's presence and influence in Central Asia, especially in 
Kazakhstan, have been increasing. The westward strategy 
articulated by Chinese President Xi Jinping in his "New Silk Road 
economic belt" highlights Central Asia's importance for Chinese 
economy and development. China has been investing billions of 
dollars in the energy sector which include a series of contracts with 
Kazakhstan worth $30 billion, 31 agreements worth $15 billion with 
Uzbekistan, and natural gas transactions with Turkmenistan in 
2013, which reached about $16 billion. Following tables and pie-
charts show, how China is emerging as a major player in 
Kazakhstan. 
Table 1.2 Comparison of exports of Kazakhstan to China, Russia, 
and United States 
Country 2000 (% of total exports) 2015 (% of total exports) 
China 7.75 11.93 
United States 2.04 0.95 
Russian Federation 19.77 9.9 
Source: -http:// wits.worldbank.org/ Country Profile/en/ Country/ KAZ/Year/ 
2000/TradeFlow/Export 
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Table 1.3 Comparison of imports from China, United States and 
Russia 
Country 2000  
(% of total imports) 
2015  
(% of total imports) 
China 3.06 16.64 
United States 5.62 4.86 
Russian Federation 47.86 34.45 
Source:http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/KAZ/Year/LTST/TradeFl
ow/Import/Partner/all/ 
Table 1.4 Percentage change in the imports and exports: 
Comparison of 2000 and 2015 
Country Import Export 
China 543.79 increase 53.9 increase 
United States 86.47 decrease 53.4 decrease 
Russian Federation 71.9 decrease 49.9 decrease 
 
Table 1.5  Percentage change in imports and exports: 2016 
Country Trade (2016) Trade in 2001 
China 12.72% 646,651 + 171,984 = 5.4 % 
United States 3.05% 347,205 + 142,412 = 3.2% 










Trade of Khazakstan in 2016: 
Comparing China, United 









Khazakstan total trade accounts in 2016: 36,775,323 (export) + 25,174,779 
(import) = 61950102 
Khazakstan total trade accounts in 2001:8,485,515 (export) + 6,280,202 















After comparing 16 years of data from 2000 to 2016, it is very much 
clear that china is in leading player compare to US and Russia. 
Over the last twenty years, the relationship between China and 
Kazakhstan has been carefully cultivated according to a 
comprehensive bilateral strategic partnership based on a 
contractual framework covering numerous agreements and 
documents. China is Kazakhstan's leading economic and trade 
partner and, Kazakhstan, among the post-Soviet states, is China's 
largest trading partner. The volume of mutual trade in 2016 
reached 12.72% of total trade. In 2001, the percentage was a mere 
5.4% of the total trade. In 2015, exports from Kazakhstan to China 
were 11.93% while it was 7.75% in 2000. 
At least 22 energy companies with Chinese participation are active 
in Kazakhstan's oil sector; ten of them are wholly or almost entirely 
controlled by Chinese investors. The share of Chinese companies in 
the Kazakh oil industry is expected to exceed 40% soon (Forbes, 
2013). The most prominent participant is CNPC, which has 
acquired stakes in Kazakh energy companies and is involved in 
various upstream and infrastructure development projects. For 
 
Trade of Khazakstan in 2001: 
Comparing China, United 
States and Russian …




Anurag Tripathi                                           The Great Game that Never Ends 
69 
 
example, it owns 60% of Kazakhstan's Aktobe Oil and Gas 
Corporation, a subsidiary of the national energy company Kaz 
Munai Gaz (KMG). Together with KMG, CNPC constructed the 
Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline, with a capacity of 12.5 million 
tonnes per year. The two companies are also constructing the 
Kazakhstan–China gas pipeline, which will eventually link up to 
the Central Asia–China pipeline network (Reuters, 2013). 
China has rapidly become a major player in Kazakhstan. China‟s 
engagement in Kazakhstan stems from four basic factors. Firstly, 
Beijing wants to ensure its access to Kazakhstan‟s rich energy 
sources which is very important to meet its growing energy 
(particularly oil and gas) needs in the future. According to one 
estimate, China‟s domestic oil demand is expected to rise by 
around 4% annually (Singh, 2000). Kazakhstan has vast oil and 
natural gas reserves and at the end of 2008, Kazakhstan‟s proven 
total reserves of petroleum and natural gas were estimated to be 
1500 m. metric tons and threetrillion cubic meter respectively(The 
Europa World Year Book: 2008).  Secondly, China wants to subdue 
the ethnoreligious nationalism in its Xinjiang province. Thirdly, it 
wants to protect its own political and economic interests in 
Kazakhstan vis-à-vis other external players. Finally, China wants 
access to the Kazakhstani market to sell its consumer goods. 
Chinese interest in Central Asia did not emerge simultaneously but 
arose sequentially. The priorities of China‟s diplomacy have been 
changing ever since the disintegration of the USSR and the 
formation of independent states in Central Asia in 1991, China has 
been continuously rethinking its interests and policy in the region 
(Rumer, Eugene, Dmitri  &  Zhao, 2007, pp.170-172).  
Border dispute was another issue. When the USSR dissolved, Sino-
Soviet border talks were half completed. In 1989 China and the 
Soviet Union initiated the Sino-Soviet agreement on the Eastern 
section of the border. However, the two parties had not yet reached 
agreement on the western section of the border. There is only a 45 
kms border between China and Russia in the western section. Far 
more extensive are the borders between China and the newly 
independent Central Asian countries. These are more than 1700 
kms with Kazakhstan, about 1000 kms with Kyrgyzstan, and about 
450 kms with Tajikistan. The four ex-Soviet Republics (Russia, 





Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) decided to hold further 
negotiations with China. In September 1994, the parties reached an 
agreement on the western section of the Sino-Russian border, 
where, after Sino-Soviet armed border clashes in 1969, both sides 
had deployed troops and equipment on a huge scale. With the 
improvement in bilateral relations, the countries significantly 
reduced military forces deployed in the border regions but still 
required an institutional mechanism to guarantee border security. 
To meet this need on 26th April 1996 China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the treaty of deepening military 
trust in border regions, which contained the following provisions.  
1. Military forces deployed in border regions will not attack 
each other. 
2. No side will conduct military exercises that are targeted at 
each other. 
3. The scale, range and number of military activities scheduled 
to be conducted within 100 km of the border 
4. Each side will invite the other to observe military exercises 
that involve the use of live ammunition. 
5. Dangerous military activity are to be avoided and  
6. Friendly communications between military forces and 
frontier guards in border regions should be promoted. 
On the basis of this treaty, in 1997 the parties agreed to reduce the 
military forces in the border regions; 
1. Military forces deployed in border regions were to be 
reduced to a level compatible with good neighbourly 
relations and defensive in nature. 
2. No side would use, or threaten to use, force against the 
other or unilaterally seek military superiority 
3. The military forces deployed in border regions would not 
attack the other side. 
4. All sides would reduce the number of military personnel 
including the army, air force, air defence forces, and frontier 
guards, and also reduce the quantity of the main categories 
of weaponry deployed with 100 kilometres of the border. 
5. The upper limit after reduction, as well as the method and 
time limit for implementation, would be specified at a later 
date. 
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6. The parties would exchange pertinent information on 
military forces in border regions and 
7. Implementation of treaty was to be supervised. 
These two agreements (the treaty on deepening military trust in 
border regions and the treaty on reduction of military forces in 
border regions) are of fundamental significance for the border 
security of China, Russia, and the Central Asian States. Border 
security and stability have always been the central focus of China‟s 
diplomacy in Central Asia. Resolution of border issues and border 
security are a prerequisite for China‟s goal of a favourable 
environment. 
However, border security has been moved down in China‟s list of 
priorities since 1997.The 1998 Almaty joint statement of the 
“Shanghai five” proclaimed, for the first time that the member 
states (Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) 
would unite to combat terrorism and that none would allow its 
own territory to be used for activities that harm the sovereignty, 
security, and social order of another member state. These countries 
established the SCO on 15 June 2001 and adopted the Shanghai 
“convention on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism”. 
This meant not only a redefinition of SCO activities but also a 
reconsideration of China‟s interests in Central Asia. The main 
motive for this change was the resolution of border issues and 
creation of an institutional guarantee of border security. Resolution 
of border and security issues also resulted in a qualitative change in 
the relations between China and the Central Asian countries and 
made more extensive cooperation possible (Ibid., pp. 170-172).  
The primary goal of China‟s anti-terrorist policy in Central Asia is 
to counteract the “East Turkestan” movement in Xinjiang – that is, 
maintain stability in northwestern China and oppose a separatist 
division of the country. The northwest region has always been a 
problem for China‟s central governments. 
Kazakhstan’s Interests in China 
On its part, Kazakhstan also needs Chinese assistance in attaining 
several of its objectives: Firstly, it needs Chinese economic 
assistance and policy guidance for its domestic economic growth. 
Secondly, Kazakhstan views China as a strong alternative to Russia 





to lessen its dependence on the latter. China has been able to help 
Kazakhstan to exploit and export the energy resources available in 
Kazakhstan by providing ample investment funds and exporting 
routes. Thirdly, Kazakhstan also wants to avert any possible ethnic 
extremism from its complex ethnographic structure, which has 
some commonality with that of Xinjiang province of China. Finally, 
Kazakhstan finds in China a lucrative market for its exports. 
Since the establishment of their diplomatic links, both sides have 
been exchanging high-level visits with each other. Serious attempts 
are being taken by both the nations to resolve mutual difficulties 
and elevate the political and economic relations between them. A 
“Historic Border Accord” was signed between the two nations on 
26 April 1994 on the eve of the then Chinese Prime Minister Li 
Peng‟s visit to Kazakhstan (Zardykhan, 2002). On this occasion the 
two countries agreed to eliminate all transport restrictions between 
them and affirmed the inviolability of their current borders 
(Hunter, 1996, pp.124-125).  
It is important to note here that the Xinjiang province of China 
plays a major role in Kazakh-China trade and economic relations. It 
is the only province of China which shares a common border with 
Kazakhstan. In fact, a major part of Kazakhstan‟s trade with China 
is concentrated in the Xinjiang province. For example, Xinjiang‟s 
share in Kazakh-China trade in 1996 was more than 90% (Raczka, 
1998).  
Importantly, of the five Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan 
remained the largest trading partner with China. Its annual growth 
rate was $434 million (Liu, 1998). But in 1994, China‟s trade with 
Central Asian states was $577 million, which was 5% less than in 
1993. In particular, China‟s trade with Kazakhstan came 
substantially down to$335 million, 22% less than the amount in 
1993. This was due to trade adjustments in export and import 
policy between Kazakhstan and China, besides the export of some 
shoddy consumer goods made in China and exported to 
Kazakhstan in 1993 which seriously damaged the reputation of 
Chinese exports. 
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Table 1.6 Sino-Kazakhstan Trade, 1992-2010 (in million dollars) 













Source:  IMF, “The People‟s Republic of China” 1998, Trade Statistics Yearbook August 1998, 
p.158 (United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics database). 
Though there was a slow growth over the years in the volume of 
trade between Central Asian states and China, there is enough 
scope for the increase of trade between them. In 1997, China‟s total 
trade with Kazakhstan was $ 528 million and in 2010, it was $ 996.1 
million.  
Kazakhstan’s Place in Chinese Diplomacy 
Kazakhstan is important to China and constitutes one of the key 
dimensions of its foreign policy. Chinese diplomacy divides 
relations with the outside world into three basic categories: great 
powers, neighbouring countries, and developing countries. 
Relations with great powers mainly seek to resolve issues 
pertaining to the international structure and strategic balance. 
Links with surrounding countries concentrate mainly on issues 
pertinent to China‟s immediate environment. Relations with 
developing countries primarily concern the issues of China‟s 
posture toward the south-north contradictions and its relations 
with a vast number of small and medium-sized countries. 
Maintaining international recognition of one China and creating 
international conditions to resolve the Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan 
issues are strategic goals of China‟s diplomacy.  
In the realm of Chinese diplomacy, Kazakhstan is considered as a 
medium-sized partner and hence does not belong to the category of 





major powers. Kazakhstan‟s ranking corresponds to the Chinese 
conception of “periphery diplomacy”, one of the principal concepts 
in its foreign strategy. This concept has three connotations: First, it 
refers to the neighbouring countries that share borders with China. 
Second, it not only refers to contiguous states but also those that are 
very close, such as Japan and South Korea. Third, as China‟s 
diplomacy developed, it has extended the concept of periphery still 
further. This notion refers to peripheral areas that are important for 
China‟s security, economic, and political interests. The concept of a 
larger periphery has some ambiguity in practice; it can be 
expanded without limit and include the Middle East and even 
farther territories. The concept of the larger periphery is employed 
mainly at the theoretical level and rarely used in diplomatic 
practice. There is no corresponding larger periphery policy (Rumer 
et al. 2007, pp. 170-172).  The goal of China‟s peripheral strategy is 
to promote friendly relations with all the contiguous or proximate 
countries that form a stable belt around the country. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the principal security 
threat to China.  An optimistic assessment of China‟s role in a 
multipolar world has caused greater concern in Beijing about the 
emergence of US-led unipolarity. Beijing used this as an 
opportunity to play a new role in regional affairs that would make 
the best use of its political, economic and military capabilities. The 
emergence of independent Kazakhstan gave China the opportunity 
to reassert its traditional regional interests. 
From China‟s perspective, the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
accelerated the process of de-linking local and regional conflicts 
from superpower rivalry. Beijing sees opportunities among the 
competing interests of contiguous (Iran, Pakistan, India and Russia) 
and non-contiguous (Turkey and Saudi Arabia) actors in Central 
Asia. China‟s ability to play a new geopolitical game in Kazakhstan 
is based on “comprehensive national strength” that encompasses 
political, cultural, social, and economic as well as traditional 
interests. Geography also favours its active role in Kazakhstan 
(Walsh, 1993).  
China has the capacity to link with Kazakhstan through trade as 
well as politics. The geopolitical situation near western China is 
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delicate, as the Xinjiang province shares a border with half a dozen 
countries including Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and most of the 
members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Many of these 
countries have both internal and external security problems. Since 
China‟s problems in Xinjiang are ethnoreligious and separatist, 
clearly China is wary of the disturbances involving people of the 
same religion or ethnic origin of the Uyghur minority. 
Conclusion 
For the first time in its history, China is actually leading an 
international coalition. This leadership can be seen in China‟s role 
as an initiator of the coalition Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
Although the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is only a regional 
organisation, nobody can deny its importance when it comes to 
playing its role in Central Asia. At the same time, China‟s active 
role in the region has its consequences. If China becomes too active 
in its new role, it might cause suspicion among other states and 
would thus be accused of pushing for hegemony. Since the ex-
Soviet states in the region are sensitive to threats to their 
sovereignty, a development of this kind could lead to the collapse 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which would jeopardise 
not only China‟s prospects in the region but also the peaceful 
development in Central Asia. 
Many external powers wanted to fill the vacuum created by the 
disintegration of the former USSR. The Islamic states tried to 
influence the region through their belief in a universal Islam and 
wanted to bring the region into their fold. Powerful external 
powers are also attracted towards the region in order to keep it 
under their influence because of the geostrategic, geopolitical and 
geo-economic significance of the region. The regimes in Central 
Asia are also faced with a dilemma as to which side they should 
tilt. The external powers came to the region with a basket of offers 
in order to help the regimes in Central Asia come out of their 
problems. However, the Central Asian states have been cautious in 
doing business with external powers keeping in mind the Russian 
factor. 





Neither Kazakhstan nor China is in favour of rising western 
influence in their adjacent regions. While China‟s policy always 
supports multipolar world order, Kazakhstan does not wish to be 
entrapped in the sphere of American hegemony. Thisis reflected in 
the increasing cooperation between China and Kazakhstan. 
Importantly, China appreciates the importance of Kazakhstan in 
several dimensions and accordingly devises its policy with care. 
When dealing with Kazakhstan, China also keeps in mind other 
important factors, such as Russia, the United States, and Islamic 
fundamentalism. As a result, Kazakhstan is approached from the 
broader perspective of Central Asia and the states beyond. At the 
same time, however, China does differentiate between Kazakhstan 
and Central Asia, giving Sino-Kazakh relations special attention in 
its strategic thinking and undertakings. While China deals with all 
the Central Asian states on the basis of equality, it places special 
emphasis on Kazakhstan. This corresponds both to Kazakhstan‟s 
importance in the region and it coincides with the national interests 
of both countries. 
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